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Abstract
This paper analyses the equilibrium unemployment rate in an alter-
native type of search frictions model in which e¢ ciency wages replace
the assumption of wage bargaining. We identify an important inter-
action between search frictions and e¢ ciency wages that a¤ects the
optimal wage and through this a¤ects the equilibrium unemployment
rate. Calibrations of our model suggest that the equilibrium unemploy-
ment mainly reects search frictions and interactions between search
frictions and e¢ ciency wage e¤ects.
Keywords: e¢ ciency wages, search frictions, equilibrium unemploy-
ment, labour market policy
JEL Classication: J3, J6
1 Introduction
Explaining unemployment is one of the central problems in economics. The
currently dominant approach in the literature is the search frictions model
(e.g. Diamond, 1982, Mortensen and Pissarides, 1999, Pissarides, 2000).
Corresponding Author: Department of Economics, University of Bath, Bath BA2 7AY
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This provides a simple framework for the analysis of the labour market and
associated policy issues (eg, Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences, 2010).
The search frictions model has two main elements. The rst is a model of
the imperfect matching of workers with jobs, explaining why unemployed
workers coexist with unlled vacancies. This is an essential part of the
model. The second is a model of how the surpluses accruing to workers and
rms from a job match are divided between the parties through bargaining
over the real wage. This aspect of the model seems less essential. In the
search frictions model, wage bargaining ensures that the real wage exceeds
the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure and thus
explains the existence of involuntary unemployment. However, this is not the
only way of doing this. A leading alternative to wage bargaining is e¢ ciency
wage theory: therefore, an alternative type of search frictions model can be
obtained by combining imperfect matching with e¢ ciency wages.
In this paper, we explore this alternative type of search frictions model.
There is a small existing literature on this. Malcomson and Mavroeidis
(2007) incorporate a Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) no-shirking constraint into
a search frictions model with wage bargaining, which they estimate using
data for the US and UK; see also Zaharieva (2010). We take a di¤erent ap-
proach. We combine search frictions with a simple model of e¢ ciency wages,
similar to Solow (1979) and Summers (1984), in which output depends on
the amount of e¤ort expended by workers, which is in turn a function of
the wage. Our analysis focuses on wage-setting and the determination of
the equilibrium unemployment rate. We nd that these have similar deter-
minants: search frictions (eg the e¢ ciency of job matching and the cost of
posting vacancies) and factors relevant to e¢ ciency wages (eg the respon-
siveness of e¤ort to the wage). In existing search frictions models, wages and
unemployment also reect search frictions but also depend on the relative
bargaining power and the reservation wage of workers1.
We argue that there is an important interaction between search fric-
tions and e¢ ciency wages which a¤ects the optimal wage decision of rms
1The model used in Wesselbaum (2013) is broadly similar; however he develops a DSGE
model and uses this to study the impact of macroeconomic shocks.
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and through this a¤ects the equilibrium unemployment rate. In this, as in
other models with e¢ ciency wages, output depends on e¤ective labour, the
product of employment and e¤ort per worker. As Solow orginally argued,
rms maximise prot by minimising the cost of e¤ective labour. The inter-
actions between search frictions and e¢ ciency wages arises because search
frictions a¤ect the optimal composition of e¤ective labour. An increase in
hiring costs due to search frictions leads the rm to reduce employment and
increase its wage, leading to higher levels of e¤ort.
We use standard values from the literature to parameterise our model.
With these, the equilibrium rate of unemployment is 4.61% (close to the
average unemployment in the US over recent decades). If there were no
e¢ ciency wage e¤ects, our model would simplify to a search frictions model
where rms set the wage unilaterally. In this case, the equilibrium unemploy-
ment rate would be 2.63% (the wage would be lower, equal to the reservation
wage of workers). If there were no search frictions, our model would simplify
to an e¢ ciency wage model; in this case the equilibrium unemployment rate
would be 4% (the wage would be higher, largely as a consequence of the
lower unemployment rate).
We also decompose the equilibrium unemployment rate, keeping the
real wage constant, into a component due to search frictions (3.57%), a
component due to e¢ ciency wages (0.14%) and a component that due to
interactions between the two (0.90%). Thus, the interactions we found at
the level of the rm have an important impact on the aggregate equilibrium
unemployment rate.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2) analy-
ses the optimal behaviour of households, our formulation here is similar to
Danthine and Kurmann (2010). Section 3) analyses the optimal employment
and wage-setting choices of rms. We obtain a simple generalisation of the
well-known Solow (1979) Condition that reects search frictions and from
this show that the optimal wage reects search frictions and e¢ ciency wage
e¤ects. Section 4) analyses the equilibrium unemployment rate, showing
how this reects search and matching frictions, e¢ ciency wage e¤ects and
interactions between them. Section 5) presents a calibration of our model.
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Section 6) summarises and concludes.
2 Households
There is a continuum of identical households on the unit interval, each con-
taining a continuum of identical individual members. We assume that each
individual inelastically supplies one unit of labour in every time period; the
household provides full unemployment insurance so all household members
have the same level of consumption. Household members supply e¤ort to
the rm that employs them; they su¤er no disutility from supplying what
they perceive to be the "fair" level of e¤ort. The utility of household j is
E0
1X
k=0
kflog(C(j)t+k) N(j)t+k[e(j)t+k   e(j)t+k]2g (1)
where C(j) and e(j) denote consumption and e¤ort, N(j) is the fraction of
household members who are employed and e is the perceived fair level of
e¤ort.
The budget constraint of the household is
C(j)t+
B(j)t
Pt
=
W (j)t
Pt
N(j)t+!(1 N(j)t)+(1+it 1)(B(j)t 1
Pt
)+(j)t (2)
where B is the households nominal holdings of one-period bonds, P is the
aggregate price level, W is the nominal wage, ! are real unemployment
benets, i is the nominal interest rate paid on bonds,  are real prots
received by the household net of lump sum taxes.
The household chooses consumption, the amount of e¤ort to supply and
bond holdings to maximize (1) subject to (2). The optimality conditions
include
1
C(j)t
= Et
(1 + it)
(1 + t+1)
1
C(j)t+1
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and
e(j)t = e
(j)t
where t =
Pt Pt 1
Pt 1 is the ination rate.
2.1 The Fair Level of E¤ort
We assume that the fair level of e¤ort depends on the proportional gap
between the wage and a reference wage.
Assumption 1. Following Summers (1988), the fair level of e¤ort at rm
i is given by
e(wit; wit) = (
wit   wit
wit
) (3)
for wit > wit and 0 <  < 1, where wit = WitPit is the real product wage of
rm i, Wit is the nominal wage paid by rm i, Pit is the price set by rm i
and w is the real reference wage2.
Assumption 2. The reference wage depends on factors external to rm i.
Specically
wit = (1  Ut)wt (4)
where u is the unemployment rate and wt is the average wage paid by other
rms. We assume that wit > b; this ensures a positive level of output.
We dene the elasticity of e¤ort with respect to the real wage at the
rm as "it =
witewit (wit;wit)
eit
. Given Assumption 1, "it can be written as
"it =
wit
wit   wit (5)
2This is expressed in terms of the real product wage Wit
Pit
rather than the real con-
sumption wage relevant to workers, Wit
Pt
. If we express e¤ort as a function of the real
consumption wage, ie e = (
Wit
Pt
 Wit
Pt
Wit
Pt
), where W it is the nominal reference wage, we can
obtain (3) by multiplying numerator and denominator by Pt
Pit
.
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3 Firms
There are two types of rms. Imperfectly competitive intermediate goods
rms hire labour and use this to produce intermediate goods. These are
purchased by competitive nal goods rms who use them to produce nal
consumption goods which are sold to households.
3.1 Final Goods Firms
The production function for nal goods is
Yt = [
Z 1
0
Y (i)
( 1)=
t di]
=( 1);  > 1
where Y (i) denotes intermediate good k. Each nal goods rm chooses
intermediate good inputs in order to minimises its cost
R 1
0 P (i)tY (i)tdi sub-
ject to [
R 1
0 Y (i)
( 1)=
t di]
=( 1)  Yt where P (i)t is the price of intermediate
good i. The implied demand for intermediate good i can then be written as
Y (i)t = (
P (i)t
Pt
) Yt
where Pt = [
R 1
0 P (i)
1 
t di]
1=(1 )
3.2 Intermediate Goods Firms
Assumption 3. The production function for an intermediate goods rm
is3
Y (i)t = Ate(i)tN(i)t (6)
where At is total factor productivity, e(i) is e¤ort at rm i and N(i) is
employment at rm i; e(i)N(i) is thus e¤ective labour input. We assume
At = At where  is a productivity shock and that unemployment benets
are indexed to average total factor productivity, ! = Ab.
3The assumption of constant returns to scale simplies but does not qualitatively a¤ect
the results derived below.
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3.3 The Labour Market
Employment evolves according to
Nit = (1  )Nit 1 + hit (7)
where h is the number of workers hired and  is the exogenous job separation
rate. The labour market is characterised by search frictions and so rms
must post vacancies in order to hire workers. Aggregate hiring is determined
by the matching function ht = M(Ut; Vt) where M 0(:) > 0, M 00(:)  0, h
are aggregate hires, U is the number of job seekers and V are aggregate
vacancies. We assume the matching function has constant returns to scale,
so ht = VtM(UtVt ; 1), hence the aggregate vacancy lling rate qt is given by
qt =
ht
Vt
= M(UtVt ), where
M(UV ) = M(
U
V ; 1). We dene the vacancy lling
rate for rm i as qit = hitVit . We assume that the number of workers hired
by rm i is proportional to the relative number of vacancies it posts, so
hit =
Vit
Vt
ht: As a result, qit = qt and so the vacancy lling rate is exogenous
at the level of rm4. We assume that the real unit cost of posting a vacancy
is proportional to total factor productivity, so itPit = At, where it is the
nominal cost of posting a vacancy.
3.4 Optimal Wages and Employment
Per-period prot for intermediate rm i is
Iit = PitYit  WitNit   itVit
where Wit is the nominal wage. In an e¢ ciency wage context, the rm
chooses employment and the wage subject to the production function, the
e¤ort function, the relationship between vacancies and employment and the
constraint Wit  b.
4We follow the literature and assume that rms seek to hire in every period.
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The rst-order condition for employment is
Pit

Ateit =Wit + it
At
qit
  (1  )Ett+1 it+1At+1
qit+1
where  =  1 is the mark-up of price over marginal cost and t+1 =
Et
Ct
Ct+1
is the stochastic discount factor. This equates the marginal revenue
generated by an increase in employment to the marginal cost of a new hire,
composed of the wage plus marginal hiring costs, i.e the cost of hiring an
additional worker in the current period less the expected present value of
the reduction in next period hiring costs implied by this. We can express
this as
1

Ateit = wit + it (8)
where, it = fAtqit   (1  )Ett+1
(1+t+1)At+1
qit+1
g is the real cost of hiring an
additional worker.
The rst-order condition for the nominal wage is
1

AtNitewit 6 Nit + it
Wit  b
and
it(Wit   b) = 0; it > 0
where  is the multiplier on this constraint. If there are e¢ ciency wage
e¤ects, the rm will set wit > wit. Since wit > b this implies it = 0
5. The
rst-order condition for the nominal wage can then be written as
1

Atewit = 1 (9)
Dividing (9) by (8), we obtain
5The constraint wit  b is thus only relevant in a pure search frictions model (a case
we return to in section 4.3 below).
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Proposition 1) The optimality conditions for employment and the wage
imply
"it =
wit
wit + it
(10)
At the optimum, the elasticity of e¤ort with respect to the wage equals the
ratio of the wage to the present value of the marginal cost of a new hire.
Combining Proposition 1) with equation (5), we obtain
Proposition 2) The optimal wage for the rm is
wit =
1
1  wit +

1  it (11)
The wage has two distinct components. The rst is a pure e¢ ciency wage
e¤ect in which the wage is a mark-up over the reference wage, where the
mark-up reects the strength of e¢ ciency wages. The second reects labour
market frictions as the worker receives a proportion of hiring costs, where
this proportion also reects the strength of e¢ ciency wage e¤ects. This wage
equation reects an interaction between search frictions and e¢ ciency wage
e¤ects. For example, an increase in the cost of posting a vacancy () in-
creases it and implies reduced employment and increased wages, leading to
increased e¤ort. Therefore search frictions a¤ect the optimal composition
of e¤ective labour. This interaction between search frictions and e¢ ciency
wage e¤ects will be reected in the equation for the equilibrium unemploy-
ment rate derived below.
The wage equation in (11) has interesting parallels with wage equations
derived in models with search frictions e.g. Pissarides (2000). In both, the
wage is an increasing function of search costs, but for di¤erent reasons. In
a search frictions model, higher search costs increase the surplus from a
job match. Since the wage bargain divides this surplus between workers
and the rm, this is reected in a higher wage6. In a model with search
frictions and e¢ ciency wages, by contrast, higher search costs induce rms
6 In a search frictions model, the surplus also reects the value of employment to a
worker. This aspect is irrelevant in this paper as the rm chooses the wage unilaterally.
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to adjust the composition of e¤ective labour by increasing e¤ort and reducing
employment, something that requires an increase in the wage. In (11), the
wage also depends on e¢ ciency wages; this e¤ect is not present in the search
frictions literature.
Propositions 1) and 2) extend results in the existing e¢ ciency wage
literature. The expression in (10) simplies to the original Solow (1979)
condition if there are no search costs. The rst term in the wage equation
in (11) is similar to expressions in Summers (1988) and Romer (2011). The
second term in (11) extends these by adding a component that reects labour
market search7. Following Solow (1979), we can interpret these results as
the outcome of minimization of the cost of e¤ective labour. In this model,
the cost of e¤ective labour is (wit + it)=eit; minimising this implies
ewit(wit + it)
eit
= 1
or
"it(1 +
it
wit
) = 1
from which we can derive the modied Solow Condition in Proposition 1).
4 Equilibrium Unemployment
We impose the equilibrium conditions "it = " , hit = h, Nit = N , it = ,
h = qN , and Ut = U , where U is the equilibrium unemployment rate. We
also impose
wit = wt = w (12)
The aggregate rst-order conditions for the wage and employment in steady
state can be expressed as
Aew

= 1 (13)
7 if there are no search costs, (11) simplies to equation (10.15) in Romer (2011)
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and
1

Ae = w +  (14)
Combining these, we obtain an implicit expression for the equilibrium un-
employment rate, given by
eq(1  ") = ^ (15)
Combining (4) and (12) implies w ww = (
U
1 U ), so e¤ort is given by
e = (
U
1  U )
 (16)
while combining (4), (11) and (12) implies the wage is determined by
w =

U   
Combining this with (10) gives
1  " = (U   
U
) (17)
We assume the matching function is M(Ut; Vt) = mUt V
1 
t ; this implies
that the vacancy lling rate is
q(U) = m(
mU
(1  U))

1  (18)
Substituting (16), (17) and (18) into (15), we obtain an expression for the
equilibrium unemployment rate.
Proposition 3) The equilibrium unemployment is determined by the fol-
lowing implicit function
(
U
1  U )
+(1 )
1  (
U   
U
) =
^

1 
m
1
1 
(19)
In (19), the unemployment rate is an increasing function of the mark-up (),
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the responsiveness of e¤ort to the wage (), the separation rate (), vacancy
costs (^); and a decreasing function of the e¢ ciency of job matching (m).
Next we consider the unemployment rates implied by a pure e¢ ciency wage
model and a pure search frictions model.
4.1 Search Frictions Model
If there are no e¢ ciency wage e¤ects ( = 0), the model becomes a search
frictions model in which the wage is unilaterally set by the rm. In this
case, the constraint on wages binds and so w = b. Combing this with
the optimality condition for employment and aggregating, the equilibrium
unemployment rate in a search frictions model (U sf ) is determined by the
condition
1

= b+
^
q(U sf )
(20)
This implies8
U sf =

 +m
1
 (1 b^ )
1 

(21)
4.2 E¢ ciency Wage Model
If there are no labour market frictions (^ = 0), the model becomes an
e¢ ciency wage model. If so, (10) simplies to the familar Solow Condition,
" = 1. From (17), this implies
U ew =  (22)
where U ew is the unemployment rate in an e¢ ciency wage model.
8Similar expressions for equilibrium unemployment can be obtained in models with
search frictions in which the bargaining power of workers tends to zero (eg Pissarides,
2000).
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4.3 The Equilibrium Unemployment Rate
Combining (19) and (21) shows that
^

1 
m
1
1 
= (1  b)( U
sf
1  U sf )

1  (23)
Substituting (22) and (23) into (19) and rearranging, we obtain
Proposition 4) The equilibrium unemployment rate satises the following
implict relationship
U =

1 + 
(24)
where
 = f 1
(1  b)(
U sf
1  U sf )

1  (
U
U   U ew )g
1 
+(1 ) (25)
The equilibrium unemployment rate is therefore an increasing function of the
unemployment rates implied by search frictions and e¢ ciency wage models.
4.4 Interpretation
The determination of the equilibrium unemployment rate is illustrated
in Figure 1). The optimality condition for the real wage in (13) is depicted
as the downward-sloping "wage" curve, while the optimality condition for
employment in (14) is depicted as the upward-sloping "employment" curve.
The intersection of these curves at point A determines the equilibrium un-
employment rate.
In the special case of a search frictions model, the optimality condition
for employment, (20) is depicted as the "employment search frictions model"
curve. Employers set the wage equal to unemployment benets, depicted
as the "benets" curve. Intersection of the "employment search frictions
model" and "benets" curves at point B determines the equilibrium unem-
ployment rate in a pure search frictions model. In the other special case of
an e¢ ciency wage model, the optimality condition for employment, given
by (14), but where  = 0, is depicted as the "employment e¢ ciency wage
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model" curve. Intersection of this with the wage curve at point C determines
the unemployment rate in an e¢ ciency wage model. Inspection of Figure 1)
shows that the unemployment rate is lower in either of these special cases.
5 Calibration and Simulation Results
5.1 Calibration
We set the discount factor  equal to 0:988 (Shimer, 2005). The job separa-
tion rate is set as  = 0:12 (Gali, 2011, and Christiano et al, 2013). Following
Shimer (2005), we assume that the parameters of the matching function are
 = 0:72 and m = 1:355. We assume the cost of posting a vacancy is
 = 0:213 . These assumptions imply that hiring costs are equivalent to
0:7% of annual output9. We assume the price markup is  = 1:2 a common
value in the New Keynesian literature (eg Gali, 2008). For unemployment
benets, we assume b = 0:4. We also assume total factor productivity is
A = 1. These assumptions imply that unemployment compensation is 60%
of wage income in our simulations. We calibrate  to give values for the
equilibrium unemployment rate and the job nding rate that match post-
war U.S. data; doing so we obtained  = 0:04. Table 1) summarises the
parameter values used in our calibration of the model.
Table 1) Calibration Parameters
  m     b
0.988 0.720 1.355 0.213 0.120 1.200 0.04 0.4
5.2 Simulation Results
These calibrated parameters imply that the equilibrium unemployment rate
is U = 4:61% and the job nding rate is f = 71%. The unemployment rate
in a search frictions model is U sf = 2:63% while the unemployment rate in
an e¢ ciency wage model is U ew = 4%.
Table 2) Simulation Results
9Gali (2011) assumes 0:1% while Christiano et al (2013) assume 1%
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U U sf U ew w f
4:61% 2:63% 4:00% 0:64 71%
These simulations show that the unemployment rate would fall to 2:63%
if e¢ ciency wage e¤ects were eliminated and would fall to 4% if search
frictions were eliminated. We can also consider the decomposition of the
unemployment rate of 4:61% into components due to search frictions, to
e¢ ciency wages and to interactions between search frictions and e¢ ciency
wages. To determine the component due to search frictions, consider point
D in gure 1). At this point, the wage is xed at w = 0:64 but employ-
ment is determined by the "employment search frictions model" relationship
in (20). The unemployment rate at point D therefore represents the rate
of unemployment in a search frictions model, at this wage. This value of
unemployment is 3:57%. To determine the component due to e¢ ciency
wages, consider point E in gure 1). At this point, the wage is again xed
at w = 0:64 but employment is determined by the "employment e¢ ciency
wage model" relationship. The unemployment rate at point E therefore
represents the rate of unemployment in an e¢ ciency wage model, at this
wage. This value of unemployment is 0:14%. The component of unem-
ployment due to interactions between search frictions and e¢ ciency wages
is therefore 4:61%   3:57%   0:14% = 0:9%. This exercise shows that the
largest component of unemployment reects the impact of search frictions
but that interactions between search frictions and e¢ ciency wage e¤ects are
also important. Table 3) summarises these ndings
Table 3) Decomposition of Equilibrium Unemployment Rate
Equilibrium Unemployment Rate of which: component due to
search frictions e¢ ciency wages interactions
4:61% 3:57% 0:14% 0:90%
These interactions imply that a change in search frictions will lead to
a smaller change in the equilibrium unemployment rate than it would in a
search frictions model. Consider, for example, a reduction in the matching
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e¢ ciency parameter, m, from 1:355 to 1. If the wage is xed at w = 0:64,
in a pure search frictions model, the unemployment rate would increase by
1:77% (from 3:57% to 5:34%). By constrast, in our model the unemployment
rate would increase by 0:77% (from 4:61% to 5:38%). This more muted e¤ect
arises because of the impact of increased search frictions on unemployment
is partially o¤set by a reduction in the wage that occurs because the increase
in unemployment reduces the reference wage.
Interactions between search frictions and e¢ ciency wage e¤ects have
policy implications. The literature on serach frictions has considered hiring
subsidies to rms which reduce the cost of posting a vacancy (Pissarides,
2001). These subsidies have a smaller impact on the unemployment rate
in the model outlined above than in a search frictions model. Consider for
example a hiring subsidy which reduces  from 0:213 to 0:13. If the wage
is xed at w = 0:64, in a pure search frictions model, this would reduce
the unemployment rate by 0:61% (from 3:57% to 2:96%). However, in the
model outlined in this paper, the reduction in the unemployment rate is only
0:17% (from 4:61% to 4:44%). A hiring subsidy reduces the unemployment
rate by inducing rms to post more vacancies. When there are e¢ ciency
wages, this is partially o¤set by a reduction in vacancies due to the increase
in the wage that results from the increase in the reference wage caused by
lower unemployment.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we have developed an alternative type of search frictions model
that combines a generic representation of e¢ ciency wage e¤ects with search
and matching frictions. We have derived a simple generalisation of the
Solow Condition, which we used to express the wage as the sum of compo-
nents reecting search frictions and e¢ ciency wages. The impact of search
frictions on wages is similar to existing search frictions models, which as-
sume wage bargaining rather than e¢ ciency wages, but our analysis di¤ers
16
from these latter models by also including the impact of e¢ ciency wage ef-
fects. We identied an interaction between search frictions and e¢ ciency
wages, through which increased search costs shifted the compostion of e¤ec-
tive labour input towards increased e¤ort per worker and lower employment.
This interaction was reected in the equilibrium unemployment rate. We
calibrated the model so that the equilibrium unemployment rate mimics the
average unemployment rate in the US in recent decades. Decomposing the
equilibrium unemployment rate into its consistuent parts, we found that
search frictions accounted for the largest part of the unemployment rate but
that the interaction e¤ect was also numerically signicant.
We would argue that our results are interesting but not denitive. We
would wish to develop our work, in two main directions. First, we have
replaced wage bargaining with e¢ ciency wages; the logical next step is to
combine both in the same model and analyse interactions between them.
Second, a natural extension of our work would analyse the decomposition
of unemployment away from equilibrium steady-state. We hope to address
these issues in future work.
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